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Whose Job is it Anyway: How the
Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
Prohibiting Employers from Hiring
Undocumented Workers Falls
Short of Achieving its Intended
Purpose *
I. INTRODUCTION
Illegal immigration and jobs are and have been hot-button issues in
American politics for quite some time. The further politicization of
immigration policies and immigrants themselves in the 2016 presidential
election cycle only exacerbated the prescience of America’s illegal
immigration woes. Inflammatory rhetoric suggesting that illegal
immigrants are “stealing” jobs from American citizens permeated the
political landscape in 2016. Rhetoric, which, at the same time, gives little
credence to the fact that some American companies and industries
actively lure immigrant workers as a source of cheap labor, which, in
turn, allows those companies to offer their goods and services to
American consumers at lower prices.
Against that backdrop, it seems unsurprising that commentators view
the federal statutory and regulatory scheme designed to punish
employers for hiring undocumented workers as an abject failure because
that system is too lenient on employers that knowingly engage in such
hiring practices. Ironically, the state of affairs concerning this area of
federal law has the same adverse effects on immigrant populations as the
Trump administration’s spate of migrant border detentions.
Undocumented immigrants are detained or deported, resulting in the
* This work is the product of skills and experiences made possible by my family and
friends that have always supported and believed in me. Your patience, persistence, and
guidance does not go unnoticed and is greatly appreciated. Special thanks to Professor Oren
Griffin for his invaluable instruction and taking the time to work with me on this project.
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separation of migrant families, which places a significant strain on the
United States judicial system and other public infrastructure to
determine the best way to deal with the children of those deported and
detained immigrants. Some of whom are American citizens.
This Comment begins with a review of situations in the news where
employers involved in the employment of undocumented workers
realized minimal or non-existent penalties for doing so. In contrast, the
undocumented workers, on the other hand, are exposed to felony
prosecutions and deportation.
From there, this Comment goes on to introduce and discuss the
legislative history and purpose of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (“IRCA”), 1 the enactment of which introduced Title 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a, 2 the federal statute prohibiting employers from engaging in the
employment of undocumented workers.
Next, this Comment delves into the substance and structure of 8
U.S.C. § 1324a, including the statute’s prohibitions, exceptions,
requirements, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties. After that, there
is a discussion concerning how and why 8 U.S.C. § 1324a falls short of
achieving the statute’s intended purpose and fosters conditions that
promote a culture war among minority blue-collar workers.
The Comment then closes with the writer’s assessments concerning a
way forward under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a that makes sense for the American
people and moves the statute closer to achieving its intended purpose.
A. The Illegal Immigration “Problem”
There were 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States
in 2017, 7.6 million of which participated in the U.S. civilian workforce. 3
According to the Brookings Institute, in 2016, the majority of
unauthorized immigrants, 62%, were in the United States because they
overstayed their visas, compared to 38% who crossed the border
illegally. 4
Commentators believe illegal immigration is problematic for a host of
reasons. Some think that illegal immigrants cause harm to Americans

Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2020).
3 Jens Krogstad, Jeffrey Passel, and D’vera Cohn, Five Facts About Illegal Immigration
in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.
4 Elaine Kamarck and Christine Stenglein, How Many Undocumented Immigrants are
in the United States and Who are They?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumented-immigrantsare-in-the-united-states-and-who-are-they/.
1
2
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and legal resident aliens “[b]y draining public funds, creating unfair
competition for jobs . . . and thereby lowering wages and working
conditions, and by imposing unwanted strains on [public] services
designed to provide [support] to American[ ] [citizens].” 5
Other commentators, however, acknowledge that the United States at
times in its past “has invited illegal immigrants even as it has pushed
them away, [through] a century of policies facilitating the recruitment
and hiring of unskilled Mexican [workers]—regardless of whether those
workers were legal or illegal.” 6 For example, the Bracero Program, under
which the United States in 1942, in response to wartime shortages of
agricultural laborers, permitted the importation of temporary guest
workers to fill vacancies in the agricultural industry. By the time the
Bracero Program ended in 1946, more than 4.6 million Mexican guest
workers had participated in the program. Many failed to return home to
Mexico and remained in the United States illegally. 7
These same commentators further believe that it is antithetical to the
United States’ history as a nation of immigrants to implement
immigration policies in a manner that merely pays lip service to the
nation’s immigrant roots. 8
B. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Workplace Raids
Through its Homeland Security Investigations (“HIS”) division, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the federal agency that
enforces 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. ICE executes 8 U.S.C. § 1324a through the
agency’s Worksite Enforcement Strategy, which “focus[es] on the
criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly break the law” related
to an employer’s obligation to verify the identity and employment
eligibility of all individuals they hire, and to document that information
using the Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9. 9
5 What’s Wrong with Illegal Immigration, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
REFORM (Mar. 2005), https://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/whats-wrongillegal-immigration.
6 Peter Skerry, Splitting the Difference on Illegal Immigration, NATIONAL AFFAIRS
(2013),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/splitting-the-difference-onillegal-immigration.
7 Id.
8 Tom Jawetz, Restoring the Rule of Law Through a Fair, Humane, and Workable
Immigration System, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 22, 2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2019/07/22/472378/restorin
g-rule-law-fair-humane-workable-immigration-system/.
9 Worksite Enforcement, Official Website of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
IMMIGRATIONS
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
(Aug.
25,
2020),
https://www.ice.gov/worksite#wcm-survey-target-id.
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The tools available to ICE to carry out its mission include Form I-9
audits, where ICE agents review a company’s I-9 forms, either on-site or
remotely, after requesting that an employer make the documents
available. ICE also can conduct workplace raids upon obtaining a
warrant predicated on a showing of probable cause that an employer is
knowingly violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324a or that illegal immigrants may be
on an employer’s premises. 10 These workplace raids typically involve
federal agents confiscating an employer’s employment eligibility related
paperwork and arresting any employees suspected of being in the United
States illegally.
The Obama administration took a more hands-off approach to
enforcement of work-related immigration laws by choosing to audit
employers’ compliance in documenting their workers’ status, rather than
conducting many on-site investigations. 11 However, after President
Trump took office, then-Acting Director of ICE, Thomas Homan, declared
that ICE would increase its worksite enforcement actions by 400%. 12 So
it is unsurprising that workplace raids have become more common under
the Trump administration. ICE opened about 6,850 workplace
investigations in 2018, compared to only 1,700 such investigations in
2017. 13
On May 12, 2008, ICE agents raided Agriprocessors, Inc., located in
Postville, Iowa. 14 Agriprocessors was the nation’s largest kosher
meatpacker at the time. 15 The raid was prompted by allegations that 80%
of Agriprocessors’ employees used falsified documents to obtain
employment and resulted in the arrests of nearly 400 unauthorized
workers. 16 Following their arrests, those workers were transported to a
nearby event venue where federal agents had set-up a makeshift
detention facility and court to prosecute those unauthorized workers. 17

10 Id.

11 Sarah Mervosh, Immigration Authorities Arrest More than 280 in Texas in Largest
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2019),
Workplace
Raid
in
a
Decade,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/us/texas-immigrationraid.html?searchResultPosition=1.
12 Nooman Merchant, ICE Raids Raise Question: What About the Employers?,
PRESS
(Aug.
14,
2019),
ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/e7113c50a6fd4d2688fc2f2b8a9a91cd.
13 Mervosh, supra note 11.
14 Tim Belay, Immigration Raid Leaves Mark on Iowa Town, NPR (June 9, 2008),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91327136.
15 Id.
16 Deportation Hearings Follow Iowa Raid, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (May 19,
2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90603031.
17 Id.
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Generally, the punishment for a person found to have been working in
the United States without proper authorization is deportation. 18
However, under the direction of the Bush administration, prosecutors
brought identity-theft related charges against the unauthorized workers
who were arrested during the raid on Agriprocessors. 19 Faced with the
possibility of two-year minimum prison sentences, more than 250
unauthorized workers accepted plea deals to serve five months in
prison. 20
The prosecution of those unauthorized workers was unusual. The
government’s actions garnered criticism from immigrants’ rights groups,
defenses lawyers, and judges, but what is more novel is that
Agriprocessors’ plant manager at the time of the raid, Sholom
Rubashkin, was arrested and charged with several violations of laborrelated immigration laws. 21 Agriprocessors’ human resources manager
also pled guilty to conspiracy to harbor illegal immigrants. 22
The prosecution voluntarily dismissed the labor and immigrationrelated charges against Rubashkin. 23 Instead, Rubashkin was
prosecuted and convicted on charges of federal bank fraud and money
laundering and sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison. 24 Although
Rubashkin avoided prosecution on any labor and immigration-related
charges, commentators viewed Rubashkin’s sentencing as the court’s
way of putting employers on notice to avoid engaging in the employment
of unauthorized workers. 25 However, against a backdrop of allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct and the Rubashkin family’s contributions to
mostly republican political campaigns, President Trump commuted

18 Jennifer Ludden, Immigrant Rights Groups Challenge ID Theft Arrests, NPR (July 24,
2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92830188.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Wayne Drash, Former Manager of Largest U.S. Kosher Plant Arrested, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/30/kosher.plant.arrest/index.html (Rubashkin was
charged with conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens for profit, aiding and abetting document
fraud, and aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft). See also Julia Preston, 27-Year
TIMES
(June
21,
2010),
Sentence
for
Plant
Manager,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/us/22iowa.html (Rubashkin was acquitted of
knowingly employing underaged workers).
22 Drash, supra note 21.
23 Derek Hawkins, How Trump Came to Commute an Ex-meatpacking Executive’s 27WASHINGTON
POST
(Dec.
21,
2017),
year
Prison
Sentence,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/12/21/how-trump-came-tocommute-an-ex-meatpacking-executives-27-year-prison-sentence/.
24 Id.
25 Preston, supra note 21.
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Rubashkin’s sentence in December 2017, after Rubashkin had served
only eight years in prison. 26
Roughly two years later, on August 7, 2019, ICE agents raided several
food-processing plants in Mississippi to further the Trump
administration’s crackdown on workplaces that hire employees without
proper work authorization. 27 ICE had reason to believe that the affected
plants violated immigration law by knowingly hiring undocumented
immigrants. 28 “There were clear signs that the companies were hiring
people who could not legally work in the country . . . . Some workers wore
ankle monitors as they awaited deportation hearings, gave Social
Security numbers belonging to the deceased or were hired twice by the
same manager even though the worker used different names on each
occasion.” 29
The raids resulted in the arrests of 680 undocumented workers and
the seizure of the companies’ business records. 30 While information is yet
to be published regarding the outcomes of any criminal prosecutions
against those undocumented workers, about 300 were released with
orders to appear before an immigration judge. 31 At least forty of them
were charged with being in the United States illegally within two weeks
of the raids. 32
Despite substantial evidence that the plants raided in Mississippi
knowingly hired unauthorized workers, as of December 2019, no charges
had been brought against the owners or managers of any of the plants

Hawkins, supra note 23.
Roy Maurer, Hundreds Arrested in Worksite Immigration Raids, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hrtopics/talent-acquisition/pages/hundreds-arrested-worksite-immigration-raids.aspx.
28 Hannah Denham, Investigators Believe Five Poultry Companies Violated Immigration
Law, Search Warrant Says, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/15/investigators-believe-five-poultrycompanies-violated-immigration-law-search-warrants-say/.
29 Id.
30 Richard Gonzales, Mississippi Immigration Raids Lead to Arrests of Hundreds of
Workers, NPR (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/749243985/mississippiimmigration-raids-net-hundreds-of-workers.
31 Roy Maurer, Do Employers Face Consequences for Hiring Unauthorized Workers?,
FOR
HUMAN
RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT
(Sep.
24,
2019),
SOCIETY
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/do-employersface-consequences-hiring-unauthorized-workers.aspx.
32 Luke Pamseth and Jimmie E. Gates, More than 40 Charged in Federal Court from
Mississippi ICE Raid, but No Company Officials, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/17/mississippi-ice-raid-more-than40-charged/2040080001/.
26
27
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involved. 33 A human resources employee for one of the plants told a
confidential informant that management did not care about employing
immigrants with questionable documentation, and investigators found
that some of the plants had not run employees’ names through E-Verify
at all. 34
One of the plants is owned by Koch Foods, Inc., which is one of the
largest poultry processors in the U.S. with 13,000 employees. The
company has an estimated $3.2 billion in annual revenue. 35 Koch Foods,
Inc. is not affiliated with the Koch brothers or Koch industries, but it
does, along with other companies affected by the Mississippi raids,
contribute to republican political campaigns. 36
The question that is prompted by ICE enforcement actions similar to
what happened with Agriprocessors and the food-processing plants in
Mississippi is, why are unauthorized workers subjected to harsher
penalties than the companies and their personnel who unlawfully hire
them? An easy but misguided answer is that unauthorized workers fill
roles that would otherwise be filled by American citizens, thereby
“stealing jobs from the American people.” But such a menial suggestion,
lacking in nuance and perspective, overlooks the fact that hiring
unauthorized workers makes sense, and dollars, for employers. 37 “Across
the country, immigrants who are in the country unlawfully often do
manual, low-paying jobs, and employers say they have no choice but to
rely on them” because “[y]ou cannot hire an American here that will show
up to work. They will not be committed to their job.” 38 So, employers that
employ unauthorized workers are no less complicit in robbing the
American people than the unauthorized workers they hire.
“[T]he latest available data show[s] that during the last twelve months
[between] April 2018 [and] March 2019[,] only [eleven] individuals and
no [corporations] were prosecuted” for knowingly hiring or continuing to

Denham, supra note 28.
Id.
35 Gonzales, supra note 30.
36 Robert Channick, Mississippi ICE Raids Hit Koch Foods, a Large Suburban Chicagobased Poultry Processor that Mostly Flies Under the Radar, CHICAGO TRIBUTE (Aug. 8,
2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-cb-ice-raids-koch-foods-chicago20190808-nxri7je3qvhrnes3gqnqwxgulq-story.html. See also Denham, supra note 28.
37 John Burnett, Employers Struggle with Hiring Undocumented Workers: “You Cannot
Hire
American
Here,”
NPR
(Aug.
21,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752336132/employers-struggle-with-hiringundocumented-workers-you-cannot-hire-american-her.
38 Id.
33
34
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employ undocumented workers. 39 In stark contrast, over the same period,
“85,727 individuals [were] prosecuted for illegal entry[ ] [into the United
States], 34,617 [individuals were] prosecuted for illegal re-entry, and
4,733 [individuals were] prosecuted for illegally bringing in or harboring
[illegal] immigrants.” 40 The disparity between punishments for
unauthorized workers and sanctions for employers who hire
unauthorized workers becomes clear upon reviewing the applicable
statutory and regulatory framework. The best place to begin this analysis
is with the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 41
II. IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
A. Legislative History
Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or
“Act”) 42 in 1952 as the nation was confronting how to deal with refugees
displaced by World War II, as well as the uncertainties associated with
the Cold War. 43 The purpose of the INA was to control immigration into
the United States in response to criticism that preceding legislation
adversely affected U.S. international relations. 44 Although the INA
ended racial restrictions on citizenship, the Act retained national origin
quotas on immigration from other countries. 45 The INA also authorized
a preference system that prioritized immigration into the United States
for skilled workers. 46 Senator Pat McCarran saw the INA as the nation’s
tool against the spread of Communism. 47

39 Few Prosecuted for Illegal Employment of Immigrants, TRAC IMMIGRATION (2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/559/.
40 Id.
41 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
42 See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101–1537).
43 Immigration and Nationality Act, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act.
See
also
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act), IMMIGRATION AND
ETHNIC HISTORY SOCIETY (2019), https://immigrationhistory.org/item/immigration-andnationality-act-the-mccarran-walter-act/.
44 Margaret C. Jasper, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Legal Almanac:
The Law of Immigration § 1:7 (2012). See also Immigration and Ethnic History Society,
supra note 43.
45 Immigration and Ethnic History Society, supra note 43.
46 Id.
47 Id. (Senator McCarran saw the INA as a “necessary weapon to preserve this Nation,
the last hope of Western Civilization . . . . If this oasis of the world shall be overrun,
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As initially enacted, the INA did not prohibit the employment of illegal
aliens. 48 The INA was amended with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA” or “Act”). 49 “Congress enacted
IRCA as a comprehensive framework for combating the employment of
illegal aliens.” 50 The IRCA was enacted amidst a confluence of business’
needs to hire cheap labor and “[f]ears traditionally associated with waves
of immigration, such as the loss of jobs to lower-wage earners.” 51 Chief
among the IRCA’s provisions are its prohibition on employers from
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and provisions providing a path
to citizenship for unauthorized workers in the United States at the time
the IRCA was enacted. 52
President Ronald Reagan, who signed the IRCA into law, viewed the
Act as the culmination of the nation’s effort to “humanely regain control
of [its] borders and . . . preserve the value of . . . American citizenship.” 53
More specifically, President Reagan believed that the Act’s authorization
of civil and criminal penalties for employers who hire illegal aliens was
the “keystone” of the Act and that it would “remove the incentive for
illegal immigration by eliminating the job opportunities [that] draw
illegal aliens” to the United States. 54
Notably, the IRCA nearly failed to make its way to the president’s desk
due to Republican opposition to the legislation in the House of
Representatives. 55 Although House Republicans favored provisions in
the bill that would provide amnesty for illegal immigrants who had lived
in the United States for the five year period preceding its enactment, they
took issue with a Democratic proposal that would have offered
permanent resident status to illegal immigrants who could prove that
they had worked in the agricultural industry for at least sixty days from

perverted, contaminated, or destroyed, then the last flickering light of humanity will be
extinguished”).
48 Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020).
49 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
50 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 404 (2012).
51 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
(2015), https://immigrationtounitedstates.org/602-immigration-reform-and-control-act-of1986.html.
52 Id.
53 Robert Pear, President Signs Landmark Bill on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/07/us/president-signs-landmark-bill-onimmigration.html.
54 Id.
55 Jerry Kammer, IRCA’s 30th Anniversary: Looking Back at October 10, 1986, CENTER
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://cis.org/Kammer/IRCAs-30thAnniversary-Looking-Back-October-10-1986.
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May 1, 1985, to May 1, 1986. 56 The Democrat’s proposal intended to
address the needs of farmworker unions and agricultural producers who
had become accustomed to a large workforce of unauthorized workers,
which allowed agrarian producers to keep their costs of production down,
which in turn, allowed those producers to bring their products to market
at reasonable prices for consumers. 57 House Republicans sought to
replace the amnesty provision for farm workers with a provision that
would allow farmers to hire up to 350,000 undocumented temporary farm
workers every year. 58 Ultimately, the House rejected a proposal to
eliminate the Democrat’s amnesty provision for farmworkers by a vote of
199 to 192. 59
B. The Purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
The IRCA amendments to the INA included the enactment of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a, which makes it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire
unauthorized aliens. 60 The purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is to eliminate the
United States labor market’s potential to induce illegal immigration by
imposing sanctions on employers for knowingly hiring workers who are
not authorized to work in the United States. 61
Numerous federal courts have commented on the purpose of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a. For example, in Collins Foods International v. United States
Immigration and Nationalization Service, 62 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “the legislative history of § 1324a
indicates that Congress intended to minimize the burden and the risk
placed on the employer in the [employment eligibility] verification
process.” 63 With “[t]he primary enforcement threat in the legislation [ ]
directed at the unauthorized alien presenting the false
documentation[.]” 64
However, the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the
purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is as stated by the United States Court of

Id.
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 797.
61 Margaret C. Jasper, The 1980s and Major Immigration Legislation Changes—The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Legal Almanac: The Law of Immigration
§ 1:10 (2012).
62 948 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
63 Id. at 554.
64 Id.
56
57
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Patel v. Quality Inn South. 65 In Patel,
the court held that “Congress enacted [8 U.S.C. § 1324a] to reduce illegal
immigration by eliminating employers’ economic incentive to hire
undocumented aliens. To achieve this objective[,] [the statute] imposes
an escalating series of sanctions on employers who hire [undocumented
workers].” 66
III. UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS: TITLE 8 U.S.C. § 1324A
A. Prohibitions
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a makes it “unlawful for a person or other entity
to hire . . . an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” 67 The
statute further prohibits persons or other entities from hiring any
individual without complying with the I-9 system for verification of
employment eligibility. 68 The statute’s prohibition expressly extends the
same requirements to agricultural associations, agricultural employers,
and farm contractors. 69 It also imposes a continuing obligation on
employers that hire authorized aliens to monitor their work
authorization and terminate their employment if they become
unauthorized to work in the United States at any time after their date of
hire. 70
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a defines an “unauthorized alien” as an employee
that is either not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States at the time of employment or an employee that is not
authorized to work in the United States under the INA or by the Attorney
General. 71
1. Unlawful for Employer to Knowingly Hire Unauthorized
Aliens
In Maka v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 72 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed an administrative
order finding that the employer violated 8 U.S.C § 1324a(a)(1)(A), by

846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 704.
67 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
68
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (establishing Form I-9). See also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324a(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
69 § 1324a(a)(1)(B).
70 § 1324a(a)(2).
71 § 1324a(h)(3).
72 904 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1990).
65
66
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knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien. 73 The charge stemmed from an
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 74 raid conducted on the
employer. The agency discovered that an individual employed by the
employer could not produce any documentation that he was lawfully
authorized to work in the United States. 75 The employer argued that it
was not required to provide I-9 documentation for the subject employee
because that employee had worked for the employer prior to the
enactment of § 1324a. Therefore, the employer was covered by the Act’s
“grandfather provision.” 76
The court concluded that the employer knew that the subject employee
entered the United States without work authorization on a
nonimmigrant visitor visa and, in fact, hired the employee after the
enactment of § 1324a. 77 The employee lost his “grandfather” status
because he quit his initial employment with the defendant employer, and
the employer rehired him after the enactment of § 1324a. 78 As such, the
court held that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of
the administrative order that the employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized alien. 79
a. Affirmative Defense
An employer’s good faith compliance with the requirements of Form I9 provides an affirmative defense when the employer is charged with
having knowingly hired an unauthorized alien. 80

Id. at 1353.
See Immigration and Naturalization Service, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/immigration_and_naturalization_service_(ins) (INS was
tasked with enforcing immigration and naturalization laws until 2003. The INS was
abolished in 2003 and its function placed under three agencies—the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)).
75 904 F.2d at 1354.
76 Id. at 1354–55. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(n)(3) (“(A) Section 274a(a)(1) [ ] of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [(Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1))] shall not apply to the
hiring, or recruiting[,] or referring of an individual for employment which has occurred
before the date of the enactment of this Act”). See also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.7(b) (“[A]n employee
who was hired prior to November 7, 1986 . . . shall lose his or her pre-enactment status if
the employee: (1) Quits; or (2) Is terminated by the employer . . . ; or (3) Is excluded or
deported from the United States or departs the United States [voluntarily]; or (4) Is no
longer continuing his or her employment . . . .”).
77 904 F.2d at 1359.
78 Id. at 1361.
79 Id.
80 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
73
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2. Unlawful for Employer to Fail to Comply with Employment
Verification System
An employer violates § 1324a if it fails to comply with the federal
employment eligibility verification system to assure that a newly hired
employee is authorized to work in the United States. The requirements
of the I-9 system are laid out in further detail below, but Split Rail Fence
Co. v. United States 81 provides an excellent example of an employer’s
deficiencies regarding Form I-9 requirements.
In Split Rail Fence Co., the employer was the subject of an ICE
enforcement action involving multiple counts for violations of § 1324a.
One count related to the employer’s verification of a Mexican national’s
employment eligibility. 82 The employer verified that employee’s
employment eligibility using his Mexican passport, which included a
temporary I-551 stamp. The I-551 stamp authorized the employee to
work in the United States until a specified future date. However, the
employee worked beyond the expiration of his work authorization, and
the employer failed to update or re-verify his employment authorization
on or after the date his employment authorization expired. 83
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the
employer’s petition for review of the outcome of ICE’s enforcement action
concerning the charge that the employer failed to comply with I-9
requirements. 84 The court held that the I-9 Employment Eligibility
Verification System required the employer to, in the case of an individual
authorized to work in the United States for a fixed-term, record the date
of expiration of that individual’s work authorization on Form I-9, and reverify that employee’s work authorization on or before the work
authorization expiration date. 85 The employer’s failure to do so was
sufficient to find the employer liable under § 1324a.
3. Unlawful for Employer to Knowingly Continue to Employ
Alien with Knowledge that Alien has Become Unauthorized to
Work in the United States After the Date of Hire
In New El Rey Sausage Co. v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 86 the employer petitioned for the review of an order finding that
852 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1236.
83 Id. at 1235.
84 Id. at 1237.
85 Id. at 1237–40; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(vii) (“[i]f an individual’s employment
authorization expires, the employer . . . must reverify on the Form I-9 to reflect that the
individual is still authorized to work in the United States; otherwise, the individual may
no longer be employed, recruited, or referred”).
86 925 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
81
82
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the company violated § 1324a by knowingly continue to employ two
unauthorized aliens, with knowledge that they were unauthorized to
work in the United States. 87
The case began when INS informed the employer that an agent would
visit their site to inspect the employer’s I-9 forms. The inspection
uncovered deficiencies with the employer’s I-9 forms, so the agent
checked alien registration numbers provided by the company’s
employees. The INS agent found that the alien registration numbers the
employer submitted for nine employees were either non-existent or had
been issued to someone else. The INS agent then informed the employer
by letter of the deficiencies regarding those employees’ employment
authorization. The agent further informed the employer that unless
those individuals could provide valid employment authorization, they are
considered to be unauthorized aliens, and their continued employment
could expose the employer to civil proceedings. 88
In response to INS’s mandate, the employer merely asked the
employees on the list whether the documents they submitted to show
their work authorization were valid. Two of the subject employees orally
maintained that they were authorized to work in the United States. The
employer accepted their word and did not ask those employees to produce
further documentation of their work authorization. INS later found that
the employer continued to employ the two employees listed on the
agency’s initial list of employees with invalid work authorization. 89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
administrative order finding the employer liable for knowingly continue
to employ unauthorized aliens. 90 The court held that an employer’s
constructive knowledge that an employee is unauthorized to work in the
United States is sufficient to find that the employer knew of an
employee’s unauthorized status. 91 The court reasoned that INS’s letter to
the employer informing the employer of what employees were
unauthorized and why provided the employer with constructive
knowledge that those employees’ work authorizations were invalid.
Therefore, the employer’s failure to take corrective action, despite
continuing the employment relationship with those unauthorized
individuals, constituted a violation of § 1324a(a)(2). 92

Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1154–55.
89 Id. at 1155.
90 Id. at 1154.
91 Id. at 1157–58.
92 Id. at 1159.
87
88

SOLOMON - BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

WHOSE JOB IS IT ANYWAY

1307

B. Requirements: I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification System
To enforce its prohibition on employers knowingly hiring unauthorized
aliens, § 1324a requires that employers comply with the federal
employment verification system, Form I-9, by “attest[ing] [under the
penalty of perjury] that they have verified that an employee is not an
unauthorized alien by examining approved documents” provided by
prospective or newly hired employees. 93 “This requirement applies to the
hiring of any individual regardless of citizenship or nationality.” 94
On Form I-9, an employee must attest under the penalty of perjury to
his or her authorization to work in the United States and present the
employer with acceptable documents evidencing identity and
employment authorization. 95 The employer must examine the
employment eligibility and identity documents an employee presents to
determine whether the documents reasonably appear to be genuine and
to relate to the employee and record the document information on the
Form I-9. 96
1. Good Faith Compliance
An employer that fails to adhere to a technical or procedural
requirement in attempting to comply with the I-9 system will avoid
sanctions if there was a good faith attempt to comply with the
requirement the employer is charged with having violated. 97 However,
the good faith argument is not available for employers under certain
circumstances.
a. Exception for Failure to Correct After Notice
An employer’s good faith attempt to comply with the I-9 system’s
technical or procedural requirements will not absolve the employer of
liability for its failure to comply if: (1) ICE has explained the basis for the
failure to the employer; (2) the employer has been provided at least ten

Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 797.
Id.
95 I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/i-9. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(1)–(7) (acceptable
documents evidencing both identity and employment authorization). See also 8 C.F.R.
§§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(B)(1)–(4) (acceptable documents establishing identity only). See also 8
C.F.R. §§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(C)(1)–(7) (acceptable documents establishing employment
authorization only).
96 Official Website of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, supra note 95.
97 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A).
93
94
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business days to correct the failure; and (3) the employer does not correct
the failure voluntarily within the period allotted for correction. 98
b. Exception for Pattern or Practice Violators
The good faith exemption is also unavailable when an employer fails
to comply with the I-9 system for employers that have engaged in a
pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or knowingly continuing to
employ unauthorized aliens. 99
C. Enforcement Mechanism
“The regulations implementing the IRCA authorize [ICE] . . . to
conduct investigations for violations [of § 1324a] on its own initiative.” 100
The ICE investigation process typically begins with the agency’s service
of a Notice of Inspection (“NOI”) on an employer believed to be in violation
of § 1324a. Upon receipt of an NOI, an employer must produce its I-9
forms and other supporting documentation to ICE officials for inspection
for compliance. ICE then notifies the employer of the results of its
investigation in writing. If ICE determines that an employer has violated
§ 1324a, the agency may issue a Warning Notice, such as a Notice of
Suspect Documents (“NSD”), stating the basis for the violations and the
statutory provision alleged to have been violated. 101 In addition to or in
place of a Warning Notice, ICE may serve a Notice of Intent to Fine
(“NIF”), which commences proceedings to assess administrative
penalties against the employer. 102 An employer served with a NIF may
negotiate a settlement with ICE or request a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 103
When an employer requests a hearing before an ALJ, after conducting
the hearing, the ALJ will issue an order stating his findings of law and
fact. The ALJ’s order becomes the final agency decision on the matter,
but a party adversely affected by a final order may petition a circuit court
for review. 104

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(B).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(C).
100 Split Rail Fence Co., 852 F.3d at 1233.
101 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(c).
102 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(d).
103 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(e).
104 Split Rail Fence Co., 852 F.3d at 1234.
98
99
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D. Penalties
1. Cease and Desist Order with Civil Money Penalty for Hiring,
Recruiting, and Referral Violations
An employer found to have knowingly hired an unauthorized alien, or
to have knowingly continued to employ an alien who became
unauthorized to work in the United States after his date of hire, will be
ordered by an ALJ to cease and desist engaging the violative conduct and
to pay a civil penalty. The civil penalty varies with the number of
unauthorized aliens an employer is found to have knowingly hired or
continued to employ and whether the employer has been adjudged guilty
of previously having hired or continued to employ unauthorized aliens
with knowledge of their unauthorized status. 105
The first time an employer is found to have knowingly hired or
continued to employ unauthorized aliens, the employer may be subject to
a civil penalty between $250 and $2000 for each unauthorized alien at
issue in its case. An employer that has been subject to a prior action
under the statute may be assessed a penalty of between $2,000 and
$5,000 for each unauthorized alien involved in its case. While an
employer that has been subject to more than one action for violating
§ 1324a can be subjected to a fine between $3,000 and $10,000 for each
unauthorized alien it was found to have knowingly hired or continued to
employ. 106
2. Civil Money Penalty for Paperwork Violations
An employer that is found to have failed to comply with technical or
procedural I-9 requirements may be forced to pay a civil penalty between
$100 and $1,000 for each individual with respect to whom the violation
occurred. In determining the amount of the penalty, the ALJ is to
consider the size of the employer being charged, the good faith of the
employer, the seriousness of the violation, whether the individual
involved was an unauthorized alien, and the employer’s history of
previous I-9 violations. 107
3. Criminal Penalties and Injunctions for Pattern or Practice
Violations
An employer that engages in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring
or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens will be fined $3000 or less
for each unauthorized alien it is charged with having hired or continued
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
Id.
107 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5).
105
106

SOLOMON - BP (DO NOT DELETE)

1310

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

to employ. Pattern or practice violators are also subject to six months
imprisonment, and the Attorney General may bring a civil action
requesting a permanent or temporary injunction against the employer or
other relief as the Attorney General deems necessary. 108
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a Falls Short of Achieving its Intended
Purpose
The purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is to eliminate the United States labor
market’s potential to induce illegal immigration by imposing sanctions
on employers for knowingly hiring workers who are not authorized to
work in the United States. 109 In light of that purpose and the influx of
undocumented aliens into the United States between 1986 and today, the
statute falls short of achieving its intended goal. 110 It is estimated that
the population of 3.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the United
States grew to 11 million by 2017. 111 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a falls short of
stemming the tide of illegal immigration because the statute and its
enforcement are too lenient on employers.
Commentators cite § 1324a’s “knowingly” standard as the main reason
employers are rarely prosecuted under the statute. 112 For liability under
the statute, an employer must have either actual or constructive
knowledge that a worker is unauthorized to work in the United States. 113
This “knowing” standard virtually absolves an employer of liability for
knowingly hiring or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien when
the employee used fraudulent documents to show employment
authorization. 114 However, although unauthorized workers’ prevalent
use of forged documents makes it difficult for employers to be certain they
are hiring authorized workers, it makes more sense to take a hardline
approach in punishing employers for violating § 1324a.

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f).
Jasper, supra note 61.
110 Robert Siegel and Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Did We Get to 11 Million
Unauthorized Immigrants?, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/07/518201210/how-did-we-get-to-11-million-unauthorizedimmigrants (Estimated that population of 3.2 million unauthorized immigrants in U.S.
grew to 11 million by 2017).
111 Id.
112 Maurer, supra note 31.
113 Id.
114 Id.
108
109
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Additionally, Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a’s exceptions for good faith and the
tiered system for the assessment of civil and criminal penalties against
employers discourages employers from refraining from hiring
unauthorized workers. It seems antithetical that an employer is allowed
to reap the benefits of hiring unauthorized workers to the detriment of
American workers and to engage in that same behavior once or twice
more before facing the potential for any serious penalty.
The result is that some employers do not take 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
seriously, and at the same time, hiring undocumented workers makes
sense for employers. So naturally, employers continually engage in the
unlawful employment of undocumented workers. This problem is laid
bare in the case involving a Texas Construction Company, Speed FabCrete Corporation. Although Speed Fab-Crete and its officers were
ultimately assessed criminal and civil penalties, this case provides an
excellent example of the lengths employers will go to in order to source
cheap, often undocumented, labor.
Speed Fab-Crete, a construction company in Dallas, Texas, produces
prefabricated materials used in the construction of structures. Speed
Fab-Crete has been in business since 1951, and its owners have over 150
years of management experience. 115 Speed Fab-Crete holds several local
and federal accreditations and received multiple government grants and
awards. Speed Fab-Crete also received a loan for between $1 million and
$2 million under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which was
enacted to support small businesses in response to COVID-19 related
closures. 116
In 2017 an investigation conducted by ICE’s department of Homeland
Investigations (“HIS”) revealed that 43 of Speed Fab-Crete’s 106
employees were not authorized to work in the United States. Speed FabCrete subsequently entered into a settlement with HIS, under which
Speed Fab-Crete agreed to correct the problem. In exchange, HIS agreed
to forego any I-9 inspection related to the company for six months, giving
Speed Fab-Crete time to correct the deficiencies concerning the fortythree undocumented workers. 117
Instead of firing the undocumented workers or determining whether
those workers could provide proper employment eligibility documents,

SPEED FAB-CRETE, https://www.speedfabcrete.com/aboutus.
Speed Fab-Crete Corporation, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/projects/ppp-businessloans/businesses/speed-fab-crete-corporation.
117 Texas Company to Pay $3 Million after Investigation Reveals Hiring Illegal Aliens,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/texascompany-pay-3-million-after-investigation-reveals-hiring-illegal-aliens.
115
116
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representatives of Speed Fab-Crete sought to engage in the unlawful
employment of undocumented workers by consulting with Take Charge
Staffing. Representatives of Speed Fab-Crete asked Take Charge
Staffing to transfer the undocumented workers from Speed Fab-Crete’s
payroll system and onto Take Charge Staffing’s payroll and have those
workers assigned to work at Speed Fab-Crete. 118
Take Charge initially declined Speed Fab-Crete’s request and offered
to source authorized workers instead. However, after struggling to find
authorized workers, Take Charge Staffing hired twenty-three
undocumented workers who had been previously terminated by Speed
Fab-Crete and assigned them to work at Speed Fab-Crete. Speed FabCrete then sent a letter to HIS stating that all of the thirty-nine
unauthorized workers identified during the I-9 inspection had been
released and were no longer working at Speed Fab-Crete. 119
HIS eventually caught on to Speed Fab-Crete’s unlawful scheme, and
the owners of the company pled guilty to federal charges in connection
with knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. A fine of $3 million was
assessed against Speed Fab-Crete, and the owners of Speed Fab-Crete
and Take Charge Staffing face civil and criminal sanctions. 120
Although the case of Speed Fab-Crete resulted in the culpable
company and its officers facing civil and criminal sanctions, this case
shows how employers shirk their obligation to refrain from hiring
undocumented workers in the interest of lowering operating costs,
thereby increasing their capacity for profits, which, when combined with
the lenient nature of the penalties for such culpable conduct,
disincentivizes employers from complying with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
B. Executing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a in a Manner that is Lenient on Culpable
Employers and Harsh on Undocumented Workers Adversely Affects
Immigrant Populations and Contributes to a Public Crisis
In a 2008 House of Representatives hearing held before the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, speakers addressed the impact
of ICE workplace raids on children, families, and communities. 121
In opening remarks, former United States Representative for
California’s Sixth congressional district, Lynn Woolsey, began by noting
that ICE’s arrests of undocumented workers resulting from workplace
raids intensified under the George W. Bush Administration. In 2004, ICE
Id.
Id.
120 Id.
121 ICE Workplace Raids: Their Impact on U.S. Children, Families and Communities:
Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, 110th Cong. (2008).
118
119
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arrested 445 unauthorized workers in workplace raids. That number
increased to 1,3oo by the end of 2005, and in 2006, ICE arrested 4,400
undocumented workers as the result of workplace raids. 122
Former Representative Woolsey pointed out that there are about 3.1
million children of undocumented workers who are United States
citizens, and thousands of such children had been affected by ICE
workplace raids where their parents were arrested or deported. 123
Representative Woolsey also addressed stories of specific children who
had faced traumatic experiences and been separated from their parents
as the result of ICE workplace raids. One child was a six-year-old U.S.
citizen whose father was arrested in a workplace raid. The child’s father
was his only parent in the United States. That child was detained for six
weeks until his father was released from custody. 124
Ruben Hinojosa, a former Congressman from Texas, stated in his
remarks that “[c]hildren are paying the highest price” for the broken
Federal immigration system and enforcement mechanisms that allow
children to be separated from their families, causing the children of
undocumented immigrants to live in constant fear. 125
James Spero, Acting Deputy Assistant Director of ICE’s Office of
Investigations, Critical Infrastructure, and Fraud, testified on behalf of
ICE. Mr. Spero assured the Subcommittee that “ICE strikes a balance
between the operational objectives of enforcing [federal immigration]
law[s] and any humanitarian issues that may arise as a result of [any]
enforcement operation.” 126 Mr. Spero testified that, when making a
custody determination, ICE takes into account whether a detained
undocumented worker may have unattended minors and/or is a sole
caregiver for a family member with health problems. ICE does this by
coordinating with social services agencies and processing detainees’
information, “including the arrestee’s criminal record, immigration
history[,] or other relevant factors.” 127 “[I]f appropriate, [ICE] may modify
the conditions of [a detainee’s] release[ ]” by, for example, ordering that
a detainee be released under electronic surveillance. 128
Janet Murguia, President of the National Council of La Raza, testified
next. Ms. Murguia, citing evidence that ICE’s use of workplace raids is
“causing . . . harm to children, schools, child care centers[,] and
Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
122
123
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communities[,]” argued that ICE’s enforcement strategies created a
public crisis. 129 Ms. Murguia stated that when undocumented workers
are detained in ICE workplace raids, “[s]chool systems and childcare
centers are forced to mobilize on very short notice to provide protection
for children whose parents have been detained.” 130 Such rapid
mobilization and response has the effect of impairing an affected school
system’s ability to educate children at large. Ms. Murgia also referenced
the aftermath of the Agriprocessors raid, described above in Section I(B),
where hundreds of migrants were forced to rely on a local church for food
and shelter following the arrests of nearly 400 undocumented workers as
the result of ICE’s workplace raid. 131
Ms. Murguia concluded her testimony by stating that, although
America should enforce its immigration laws, there is a better way to do
so that does not result in the forceful separation of families, thus placing
strain on public resources to fill gaps caused by ICE’s enforcement
actions. 132
Most of the empirical evidence relied on by Ms. Murguia is detailed in
a report compiled by the Urban Institute titled, Paying the Price: The
Impact of Immigration Raids on America’s Children. 133 The Urban
Institute suggests that ICE’s workplace enforcement actions erode a core
value of American democracy, that “children should not be punished for
the sins of their parents.” 134 Based on observations conducted by Urban
Institute staff in the aftermath of three large-scale ICE workplace raids
in Greeley, Colorado; Grand Island, Nebraska; and New Bedford,
Massachusetts, the Urban Institute reported the following findings:
 The three raids resulted in the arrest of over 900 adults, and the
parents among those adults arrested had just over 500
children. 135
 A large majority of the children affected were U.S. citizens and
included infants, toddlers, and preschoolers. 136

Id.
Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Randy Capps, Rosa Castaneda, Ajay Chaudry, and Robert Santos, Paying the Price:
The Impact of Immigration Raids on America’s Children, THE URBAN INSTITUTE (2007),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/46811/411566-Paying-the-Price-TheImpact-of-Immigration-Raids-on-America-s-Children.PDF.
134 Id. at 1.
135 Id. at 2.
136 Id.
129
130
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 ICE’s processing and detention procedures made it difficult to
arrange care for children whose parents were arrested. Detained
immigrants had very limited access to telephones to
communicate with their families. 137
 Some single parents and other primary caregivers were released
late on the same day as the raids, but others were held overnight
or for several days. 138
 In the days and weeks following the raids, informal family and
community
networks
took
on
significant
caregiving
responsibilities and economic support of children. Families faced
major economic instability as their incomes plunged following the
arrest of working parents, usually the primary breadwinners. 139
 Many immigrant families hid in their homes following the raids
out of fear they would be arrested or deported. 140
 Some adolescents were left in the company of other teenagers and
children for days and even weeks. Some younger children
remained in the care of babysitters for weeks or months. 141
 Many parents were deported within a few days of their arrest, and
in such cases, families had to make arrangements depending on
whether the arrested parent could eventually reenter the United
States legally or would be willing to face the grave risks involved
with attempting illegal re-entry at some point in the future.
Other parents were held in detention for months and only
released after paying substantial bonds, or not released at all
before their deportation. 142
 During the time these parents were held, their children and other
family members experienced significant hardship, including
difficulty coping with the economic and psychological stress
caused by the arrest and the uncertainty of not knowing when or
if the arrested parent would be released. 143
 Hardship increased over time, as families’ meager savings and
funds from previous paychecks were spent. Privately funded
assistance generally lasted for two to three months, but many
parents were detained for up to five or six months, and others
were released but waited for several months for a final
Id.
Id.
139 Id. at 3.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 4.
143 Id.
137
138
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appearance before an immigration judge—during which time
they could not work. Hardship also increased among extended
families and nonfamily networks over time, as they took on more
and more responsibility for taking care of children with arrested
parents. 144
 After the arrest or disappearance of their parents, children
experienced feelings of abandonment and showed symptoms of
emotional trauma, psychological duress, and mental health
problems. However, due to cultural reasons, fear of possible
consequences in asking for assistance, and barriers to accessing
services, few affected immigrants sought mental health care for
themselves or their children. 145
 In all three raids, community leaders and institutions initiated
intensive and broad response efforts to assist immigrant families.
Religious institutions emerged as central distribution points for
relief because they were considered safe by families. In the long
run, church-based assistance was not sustainable due to the
limited capacity of infrastructure and staff. 146
The details set forth in The Urban Institute’s report concerning the
three
subject workplace raids shed some light on the predicament of
immigrant populations and communities in the aftermath of ICE’s
workplace raids. However, the information cited above fails to capture
the significance of the public crisis caused by ICE’s enforcement actions.
When workplace raids resulting in mass detention and/or deportation are
intensifying in frequency and number of arrests and/or deportations, it
becomes clear that ICE’s choice enforcement mechanism will have
substantial adverse effects on immigrant populations and communities
that are innumerable and far-reaching.
C. The Politicization of Immigration Enforcement Actions Under Title 8
U.S.C. § 1324a Promotes a Culture War Among Minority Blue
Collar Workers
The current enforcement of laws prohibiting employers from
employing undocumented workers favors the punishment and removal of
immigrant populations. It also gives life to socioeconomic undertones
that paint a bleak picture for the nation going forward. Take, for
example, the story of an African American employee hired by one of the

Id. at 3.
Id.
146 Id.
144
145
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plants involved in the Mississippi raids after it lost a sizable portion of
its workforce due to the raids. The employee, two years removed from
high school, secured an almost four-dollar raise (from minimum wage to
$11.23 an hour) with his new position, but the employee had some
reservations about his seemingly good fortune. 147 The employee
expressed concerns that he gained a benefit at the expense of the
unauthorized workers who lost their livelihood as a result of the ICE
raids. Concerning his new job, the employee stated, “It’s like I stole it . . . ,
and I really don’t like what I stole.” 148
Stories like the one above and the potential for recurring racially
charged socioeconomic disparities can be eliminated by putting the onus
on employers to refrain from employing unauthorized workers. Doing so
would prove beneficial to American workers. For instance, an employer
that relied on unauthorized workers because American workers are
reluctant to take the same job for a similar wage would have to respond
to the will of the people and offer a higher wage to attract workers. Such
a result is more desirable and evocative of the free-market theory than
allowing employers to benefit from the use of unauthorized workers, only
to turn around and victimize American workers by paying them an
incrementally higher wage. But only if the employer’s practice of hiring
unauthorized workers leads to any consequences for the employer.
D. A Way Forward: Employer Accountability
Any serious attempt to bring 8 U.S.C. § 1324a closer to achieving its
intended purpose of curbing illegal immigration by punishing employers
that hire and continually employ undocumented workers begins with
amending the statute and its accompanying regulations to provide
harsher penalties and fewer exceptions for employers found to have
engaged in prohibited conduct under the statute. Employers, rather than
the undocumented workers seeking employment under terms that are
drastically better than those otherwise available in their home country,
are in a better position to assure compliance with United States
immigration laws. The placement of such a burden on employers is no
different in operation than any other compliance requirement already
imposed on employers.

147 Richard Fausset, After ICE Raids, a Reckoning in Mississippi’s Chicken Country, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/mississippi-ice-raidspoultry-plants.html.
148 Id.
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1. Do Away with Exceptions for Employers found to have
Knowingly Hired or Continually Employed Undocumented
Workers.
The statutory and regulatory scheme prohibiting employers from
knowingly hiring or continuing to employ undocumented workers
simply makes too many exceptions for employers that engage in
prohibited conduct. An exception makes sense when false documents are
involved because, in that case, the employer’s ability to determine
whether a prospective employee is authorized to work in the United
States is compromised if a prospective employee submitted falsified
employment eligibility documents, i.e., a false social security number or
passport. However, in all other cases, an employer should be exposed to
criminal liability for failing to comply with federal law as it relates to the
company’s obligation to refrain from hiring undocumented workers. The
quasi civil-criminal nature of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a works an injustice on
American and undocumented workers alike.
2. Increase the Minimum Wage to a Living Wage to Encourage
American Citizens to Fill Jobs that Typically Rely on Immigrant
Workers.
A key factor driving the employment of undocumented workers in the
United States is the fact that jobs typically held by undocumented
workers are undesirable for American citizens. One way to eliminate that
problem is to federally mandate a living wage for all jobs and institute
price controls so that employers do not pass those increased operating
expenses to consumers.
The employment of undocumented workers is prevalent in industries
that typically involve manual, repetitive, low-skilled labor. For example,
the agricultural and food-service industries. Aside from the fact that jobs
typically held by undocumented workers require exposure to the
elements and other undesirable terms, those jobs usually do not pay a
living wage. 149 A living wage is defined as the amount an individual
would “need to earn to meet all of [his] basic needs, such as food,
childcare, housing, and healthcare.” 150
The working conditions and wages for jobs typically held by
undocumented workers make those positions undesirable for American
citizens, who ideally relegate themselves to such roles out of necessity
and a lack of available alternatives.

National Education Association, supra note 38.
How to Calculate Your Living Wage, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (June 8,
2020), https://www.nea.org/resource-library/how-calculate-your-living-wage.
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V. CONCLUSION
The legislative intent behind the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, as
supported by the weight of authority, indicates that Congress
contemplated that the statute would operate to dissuade employers from
hiring undocumented workers by instituting a staggered scheme
imposing civil liability and criminal liability on employers that engaged
in this prohibited behavior. Thus, it seems incompatible with Congress’
intent that in contemporary America, employers that hire and benefit
from employing undocumented workers, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, avoid the prospect of serious penalties while the undocumented
workers they employ face harsh sanctions such as deportation and time
in jail.
The American people can ill afford the very law enacted to discourage
companies from hiring undocumented workers to be executed in a
manner that forgives corporations for breaking the law while imposing
harsh sanctions on individuals trying to take care of themselves and their
families. Moreover, it is wholly inappropriate for companies to engage in
criminal behavior and escape with a slap on the wrist when the
consequences are born by the public at large. When ICE engages in
workplace raids that promulgate the inequity sewn by the current
enforcement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, immigrant families are torn apart. At
the same time, the rest of us are left to squabble over jobs that do not
even pay a living wage. Therefore, it is in the American public’s best
interest that 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is enforced in a manner that puts the onus
on employers to refrain from hiring undocumented workers. That can
only be accomplished by amending the statute to remove some of the
exceptions available to employers found to have knowingly hired or
continued to employ undocumented workers and making the punishment
available under the statute purely criminal in nature.
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